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In the course of the last decade, the tobacco indus-
try has attempted to increase the political salience
of the illicit trade in tobacco products (illicit trade)
(box 1).1 2 Tobacco companies have claimed that
sharp rises in tobacco taxation and innovative regu-
lation, such as standardised packaging and product
display bans, are drivers of the illicit trade, and
have advocated programmes of engagement with
policymakers and other social actors in an effort to
ensure that the issue is given greater consideration
in health policymaking.2–5
As part of this strategy, Philip Morris
International (PMI) has funded a series of reports
by academics at the Università Cattolica del Sacro
Cuore in Milan (hereafter, Transcrime) which
explore the potential impact of proposed regulation
on the illicit trade.6 10 11 We brieﬂy examine two
of these reports which explore the crime risks
inherent in the proposed revision to the European
Union Tobacco Product Directive 2001/37/
EC6 12 13 (hereafter described as the EU Report),
and the proposal to introduce plain packaging in
the UK (hereafter described as the Standardised
Packaging Report).6 Although Transcrime claims to
have retained full control over the research, the
reports closely reﬂect PMI’s appraisal of the poten-
tial impact of regulation on the illicit trade.11 14–17
PMI’s success in bringing an academic body with
a solid track record of criminological research into
the debate on the illicit trade represents a new
development which lends academic capital to the
industry’s efforts to represent regulation as the
main driver of illicit tobacco. Tobacco companies
optimise this effect by failing to mention PMI’s
funding when using Transcrime’s work in policy
debates, creating the impression of a broad inde-
pendent constituency in favour of the industry’s
arguments against plain packaging.16–19 The inclu-
sion of a speciﬁc question concerning the impact of
standardised packaging on the supply and demand
of illicit tobacco in a recent consultation document
circulated by the British Government arguably
exempliﬁes the increasing salience of the issue,20 as
does news that Transcrime was invited to present
its standardised packaging report to the British
House of Commons in June 2012.21 However, a
close examination of Transcrime’s work—which
builds its argument through assertion, theoretically
led judgements about the relative strengths of dif-
ferent types of evidence and questionable summar-
ies of trend data—underlines the need for
policymakers to continue critically approaching the
industry’s analysis of the trade in illicit products.
A good illustration of Transcrime’s use of asser-
tion concerns the contention that standardised
packs are likely to make it more difﬁcult for
consumers to distinguish between legitimate and
counterfeit products. This point is key to
Transcrime’s argument that standardised packaging
is likely to boost the demand for counterfeit pro-
ducts, thereby increasing counterfeiting irrespective
of the use of formal crime prevention methods,
such as high-quality tracking and tracing systems,
and conventional forms of enforcement.6 5 In
order to gauge the presence of this phenomenon
and its impact on the illicit trade, it is necessary to
know the relative differences in quality between
counterfeited and non-counterfeited branded packs
and standardised packs, whether any differences in
Box 1 Major activities comprising the illicit
trade in tobacco products.6–8
Transcrime adopts the deﬁnition of illicit trade
outlined in the World Health Organisation,
Framework Convention of Tobacco Control,
namely, ‘any practice or conduct prohibited by law
and which relates to production, shipment, receipt,
possession, distribution, sale or purchase including
any practice or conduct intended to facilitate such
activity’.6 9 This covers:
▸ Smuggling – The unlawful movement or
transportation of tobacco products (including
counterfeit products) from one tax jurisdiction
to another without the payment of taxes or in
breach of laws prohibiting their import or
export.8
▸ Counterfeiting – Cigarettes manufactured and
packaged to imitate an established brand
without the owner’s consent.
▸ Cheap or illicit whites – Cigarettes produced
legally in one country but intended for
smuggling into countries where there is no
prior legal market for them. Taxes in the
country of production are typically paid, but
avoided in destination countries.
▸ Unbranded tobacco – Manufactured,
semimanufactured and loose leaves of tobacco
carrying neither labelling nor health warnings.
▸ Bootlegging – Tobacco legally bought in a
low-tax country by individuals or small groups
and then smuggled into a country with higher
tax rates and illegally resold.
▸ Illegal manufacturing – Cigarettes
manufactured for consumption which are not
declared to the tax authorities. These cigarettes
are sold without tax and may be manufactured
in approved factories or illegal covert
operations.
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relative quality that might exist can be perceived by consumers,
and how consumers are likely to respond to this effect.
Notwithstanding a dearth of data on these issues, Transcrime
concludes that standardised packaging is ‘likely to impact on
consumers’ capacity to distinguish legitimate products from
counterfeit ones’.6
Transcrime’s analysis of Moodie, Hastings and Joossens’ 2012
study of young adult smokers’ perceptions of illicit tobacco pro-
vides an instructive example of Transcrime’s rejection of conven-
tional hierarchies of evidence.22 The ﬁndings of Moodie et al,
based on a series of focus groups (n=8, participants=54),
suggest that smokers are able to easily identify counterfeited
branded packs (because of colour variations with genuine
packs, poorer quality printing, cheaper cardboard and inferior
cellophane, which frequently sticks to packs), and that they
are primarily motivated by price and availability, rather than pack
design in their purchasing decisions. This undermines
Transcrime’s theory that standardised packaging is likely to
increase the difﬁculties consumers experience in distinguishing
between legitimate and counterfeit products.22 Transcrime
dismiss the study, partly on the basis that ‘the methodology was
not speciﬁcally designed to test smokers’ ability to spot illicit
products’, and partly on the basis of ‘evidence from other
studies, suggesting that counterfeits are frequently of excellent
quality’. 11 However, this other ‘evidence’ comprises statements
in a report by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs which are not
backed up with reference to empirical data, and a 2006 study by
the German criminologist, Klaus von Lampe, which relies on an
opaque summary of a public survey of smokers.23–25 Transcrime
does not explain the basis of its decision to reject inconclusive,
but moderately persuasive evidence, in favour of what are effect-
ively inadequately supported assertions.
Transcrime’s questionable use of trend data illustrates the way
in which its general presentation of material underpins PMI’s
broader narrative on the illicit trade. Tobacco companies’ efforts
to move the illicit trade higher up the health policy agenda are
helped by exaggerated estimates of the scale of the trade and
conservative estimates of the impact of conventional forms of
crime prevention. In practice, the considerable methodological
difﬁculties involved in estimating illicit trade and the fact that
existing estimates are based on different methods, make accurate
estimates, for the present at least, unattainable.5 13 26–30 Despite
this, Transcrime’s EU Report asserts that the magnitude of the
illicit trade is increasing.6 Similarly, the executive summary of its
standardised packaging report describes a signiﬁcant investment
in enforcement relating to the illicit trade as ‘quite successful’,
when Government ﬁgures indicate a signiﬁcant decline in the
UK illicit cigarette market from 21% (as a percentage of the
total market) in 2000/2001 (when the investment ﬁrst began to
take effect) to 10% in 2009/2010 (the last year for which
ﬁgures are available).
In summary, the illicit trade in tobacco products is a signiﬁ-
cant social problem that can weaken the impact of public health
reform.30 However, Transcrime’s work does not add anything
substantive to the existing evidence on the impact of regulation
on the trade and, on the basis of the available data, arguably
overstates the risks of regulation and taxation in shifting con-
sumption from legitimate to illegitimate markets. PMI’s ﬁnancial
support to Transcrime is part of a wider strategy aimed at gener-
ating research and data on the illicit trade which underpins
arguments that potentially overstate the criminogenic effects of
tobacco control in countries with effective tobacco regulation,
and relatively low (Norway and Australia) or declining (UK and
Canada) levels of illicit trade.7 29 31 32 In 2011, the Alliance of
Australian Retailers ran advertisements in several Australian
newspapers warning that 15.9% of tobacco products used in
Australia were illicit.33 The estimates were based on a small
survey by Deloitte funded by British American Tobacco, Philip
Morris and Imperial Tobacco, Australia. According to ‘Quit
Victoria’, Deloitte had arrived at the estimate by looking at the
quantity purchased by those who exclusively smoked illicit
tobacco (25 illicit cigarettes daily) and applying this ﬁgure to all
respondents to the survey who had admitted to smoking illicit
tobacco in the previous year.33 34 This contradicted a far larger
government survey which had found that only a small propor-
tion (1.5%) of current smokers were regular users of illicit
tobacco (using it half the time or more).33 35 Quit Victoria esti-
mated that even if illicit users smoked more than average, this
put illicit tobacco at about 2–3% of the total market.33
The industry’s increasing emphasis on illicit trade requires a
robust evidence-based response that builds on existing research
in this area.36–39 In particular, there is a need for further high-
quality, independent research aimed at: providing more accurate
estimates of the illicit trade;7 39 40 evaluating the methodologies
used in industry estimates; and assessing the impacts of different
types of regulation on the trade. There is also a need to ensure
that policy is informed by the best available, peer-reviewed
research. To this effect, a credible international agency, such as
the World Health Organisation, could be given responsibility
for collating and summarising existing academic research so that
policymakers have ready access to a reliable body of knowledge
on the illicit trade and the nature of its relationship with con-
temporary tobacco control measures.
Acknowledgements Gary Fooks and Silvy Peeters have ﬁnancial support from the
National Cancer Institute at the US National Institutes of Health (Grant Number
RO1CA160695). Karen Evans has ﬁnancial support from Cancer Research UK (Grant
Number C27260/A12294) The funders had no inﬂuence on the research design,
data collection, data interpretation or the writing of this article.
Contributors GF conceived the idea for the research, undertook most of the
analysis, and was the lead author of this article. SP and KE contributed to the
analysis and writing of the article.
Funding Gary Fooks and Silvy Peeters have ﬁnancial support from the National
Cancer Institute at the US National Institutes of Health (Grant Number
RO1CA160695). Karen Evans has ﬁnancial support from Cancer Research UK (Grant
Number C27260/A12294) The funders had no inﬂuence on the research design,
data collection, data interpretation or the writing of this article.
Competing interests None.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
Open Access This is an Open Access article distributed in accordance with the
Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial (CC BY-NC 3.0) license, which
permits others to distribute, remix, adapt, build upon this work non-commercially,
and license their derivative works on different terms, provided the original work is
properly cited and the use is non-commercial. See: http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc/3.0/
REFERENCES
1 KPMG. Project Star 2011 Results. London: KPMG LLP, 2012.
2 British American Tobacco. Annual Report 2011. London, 2012.
3 Philip Morris International. Tobacco Taxation. 2012 http://www.pmi.com/eng/
tobacco_regulation/tobacco_taxation/pages/tobacco_taxation.aspx (accessed
17 Oct 2012).
4 Philip Morris International. Philip Morris International: KPMG Study Shows Illicit
Cigarettes in EU Reach Highest Recorded Level in 2011, Fifth Consecutive Yearly
Increase. Lausance: ME NewsWire, 2012.
5 Joossens L. Deliverable 5.2: Illicit tobacco trade in Europe: issues and solutions.
Pricing Policies and Control of Tobacco in Europe, 2011 http://www.ppacte.eu/
index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=187&Itemid=29
(accessed 22 Aug 2012).
6 Calderoni F, Savona EU, Solmi S. Crime prooﬁng the policy options for the revision
of the Tobacco Products Directive: Prooﬁng the policy options under consideration
for revision of EU Directive 2001/37/EC against the risks of unintended criminal
opportunities. Transcrime - Universita degli Studi di Trento, 2012 http://transcrime.
82 Fooks GJ, et al. Tob Control 2014;23:81–83. doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2012-050788
Industry watch
group.bmj.com on October 20, 2015 - Published by http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/Downloaded from 
cs.unitn.it/tc/fso/pubblicazioni/AP/Transcrime-CP_of_the_EU_TPD.pdf (accessed
1 Aug 2012).
7 Joossens L, Raw M. From cigarette smuggling to illicit tobacco trade. Tob Control
2012;21:230–34.
8 Joossens L, Raw M. Cigarette smuggling in Europe: who really beneﬁts? Tob
Control 1998;7:66–71.
9 Article 1 World Health Organization Framework Convention of Tobacco Control.
2005. http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2003/9241591013.pdf (accessed 20
Nov 2012).
10 Transcrime, Milan. http://transcrime.cs.unitn.it/tc/fso/pubblicazioni/AP/Transcrime-
Analysis_of_the_Draft_Protocol_to_eliminate_ITTP.pdf (accessed 17 Oct 2012).
11 Transcrime. Plain Packaging and Illicit Trade in the UK: Study on the risks of illicit
trade in tobacco products as unintended consequences of the introduction of plain
packaging in the UK. Transcrime - Universita degli Studi di Trento, 2012 http://
transcrime.cs.unitn.it/tc/fso/pubblicazioni/AP/Transcrime-Plain_packaging_
and_illicit_trade_in_the_UK.pdf (accessed 1 Aug 2012).
12 Sanco DG. Roadmap: revision of the tobacco products directive. 2010. European
Commission, Brussels. http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/docs/
46_sanco_tobacco_products_directive_en.pdf (accessed 20 Aug 2012).
13 Tiessen J, Hunt P, Celia C, et al. Assessing the impact of revising the tobacco
products directive. Brussels: Rand Europe, 2011. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR823.pdf (accessed 20 Aug 2012).
14 Padilla J, Watson N. A critical review of the literature on generic packaging for
cigarettes. A report for PMI: LeCG, Brussels, 2010. Available at http://www.smoke-
free.ca/plain-packaging/documents/industry-responses/LECG_Literature_Review_
on_generic_packaging_2010.pdf (accessed 20 aug 2012).
15 Transcrime. Plain packaging and illicit trade in the UK: Study on the risks of illicit
trade in tobacco products as unintended consequences of the introduction of plain
packaging in the UK. Milan: Transcrime: Joint Research Centre on Transnational
Crime, 2012.
16 Philip Morris Limited. Standardised tobacco packaging will harm public health and
cost UK taxpayers billions: a response to the Department of Health consultation on
standardised packaging of tobacco products. London: Philip Morris Limited, 2012.
http://www.pmi.com/eng/tobacco_regulation/submissions/documents/submission%
20and%20all%20annexes%20%28combined%29.pdf (accessed 20 Aug 2012).
17 Philip Morris International. Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products.
18 British American Tobacco (New Zealand) Limited. Proposal to Introduce Plain
Packaging of Tobacco Products in New Zealand. Submission by British American
Tobacco (New Zealand) Limited, 2012.
19 British American Tobacco UK Limited. UK Standardised Packaging Consultation.
Response of British American Tobacco UK Limited, 2012.
20 Department of Health. Consultation on standardised packaging of tobacco products.
London: Department of Health, 2012. http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/
groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_133575.pdf (accessed
22 Aug 2012).
21 Transcrime. Contributes and News. 2012.
22 Moodie C, Hastings G, Joossens L. Young adult smokers’ perceptions of illicit
tobacco and the possible impact of plain packaging on purchase behaviour. Eur J
Public Health 2012;22:251–3.
23 von Lampe K. The cigarette black market in Germany and in the UK. J Financ Crime
2006;13:235–54.
24 HMRC. New responses to new challenges. Reinforcing the tackling tobacco
smuggling strategy. London, 2006 HM Treasury.
25 HM Treasury. Counterfeit cigarettes. London: HM Treasury, 2004.
26 Shafey O, Eriksen M, Ross H, et al. The tobacco atlas. 3rd edn. Atlanta: American
Cancer Society, 2009.
27 Merriman D, Yurekli A, Chaloupka FJ. How big is the worldwide cigarettes
smuggling problem? Tob Control Dev Countries 2000:366–92.
28 Mackay J, Eriksen M. The tobacco atlas. Atlanta, 2009.
29 Joossens L, Merriman D, Ross H, et al. How eliminating the global illicit cigarette
trade would increase tax revenue and save lives. Paris: International Union Against
Tuberculosis and Lung Disease, 2009 http://www.tobaccofreeunion.org/assets/
Technical%20Resources/Economic%20Reports/How%20Eliminating%20the%
20Global%20Illicit%20Cigarette%20Trade%20Would%20Increase%20Tax%
20Revenue%20and%20Save%20Lives%20-%20EN.pdf (accessed 13 Nov 2012).
30 Joossens L, Merriman D, Ross H, et al. The impact of eliminating
the global illicit cigarette trade on health and revenue. Addiction
2010;105:1640–49.
31 Jha P, Chaloupka F, Joossens L, et al. Issues in the smuggling of tobacco products.
In: Jha P, Chaloupka F Tobacco control policies in developing countries. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000:393–406.
32 HM Revenue and Customs. Measuring tax gaps 2012. Tax gap estimates for
2010–11, 2012.
33 Quit Victoria CCV. Plain packaging of tobacco products: a review of the evidence.
Victoria: Cancer Council Victoria, 2011. http://www.plainpacksprotect.co.uk/assets/
pdf/Plain_packaging_evidence_review.pdf (accessed 13 Nov 2012).
34 Deloitte. Illicit trade of tobacco in Australia. A report prepared for British American
Tobacco Australia Limited, Philip Morris Limited and Imperial Tobacco Australia
Limited, 2011.
35 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. National Drug Strategy Household
Survey. 2007, 2008.
36 Merriman D. The Micro-geography of tax avoidance: evidence from littered cigarette
packs in Chicago. Am Econ J: Econ Policy 2010;2:61–84.
37 Wilson N, Thomson G, Edwards R, et al. Estimating missed government tax revenue
from foreign tobacco: survey of discarded cigarette packs. Tob Control
2009;18:416–18.
38 Blecher E. A mountain or a molehill: is the illicit trade in cigarettes undermining
tobacco control policy in South Africa? Trends Organized Crime 2010;
13:299–315.
39 van Walbeek C, Blecher E, Gilmore A, et al. Price and tax measures and illicit trade
in the framework convention on tobacco control: what we know and what research
is required. NicotineTob Res Published Online First: 17 September 2012. http://ntr.
oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/09/12/ntr.nts170.abstract (accessed 20 Nov
2012).
40 Financial Action Task Force. FATF Guidance. Illicit Tobacco Trade, Trade. Paris: FATF/
OECD, 2012. http://www.fatf-gaﬁ.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Illicit%
20Tobacco%20Trade.pdf (accessed 13 Nov 2012).
Fooks GJ, et al. Tob Control 2014;23:81–83. doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2012-050788 83
Industry watch
group.bmj.com on October 20, 2015 - Published by http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/Downloaded from 
and policy influence in the EU and UK
Illicit trade, tobacco industry-funded studies
Gary Jonas Fooks, Silvy Peeters and Karen Evans-Reeves
doi: 10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2012-050788
2014 23: 81-83 originally published online January 15, 2013Tob Control 
 http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/23/1/81




This article cites 8 articles, 4 of which you can access for free at: 
Open Access
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/non-commercial. See: 
provided the original work is properly cited and the use is
non-commercially, and license their derivative works on different terms, 
permits others to distribute, remix, adapt, build upon this work
Commons Attribution Non Commercial (CC BY-NC 3.0) license, which 
This is an Open Access article distributed in accordance with the Creative
service
Email alerting
box at the top right corner of the online article. 
Receive free email alerts when new articles cite this article. Sign up in the
Collections




To request permissions go to:
http://journals.bmj.com/cgi/reprintform
To order reprints go to:
http://group.bmj.com/subscribe/
To subscribe to BMJ go to:
group.bmj.com on October 20, 2015 - Published by http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/Downloaded from 
